Introduction
Water withdrawals in the United States are primarily driven by use for irrigation.
Freshwater withdrawals for agriculture account for 80% of all out of stream water withdrawals from 1985 to 2005, 1 with agricultural withdrawals in the western U.S.
alone account for over 55% of all such withdrawals over that same time frame. Thus understanding the driving forces behind water use in agriculture is key for a comprehensive understanding of water demand in the United States.
To isolate the effects of water use in agriculture, this paper uses stochastic frontier analysis estimate a translog production frontier for agriculture at the state level, which allows an analysis of the structure of agriculture without the need for large quantities of detailed farm level data. Specifically this paper adopts the structure of Battese and Coelli (1995) , which uses two uncorrelated errors, a random production error and a non-negative technical inefficiency effect. The inefficiency effects utilize a variety of producer and state level characteristics to estimate production inefficiency simultaneously with the production frontier. This provides a measure of each production unit's distance from the frontier, an improvement over the standard assumption that all deviations from the frontier are due to inefficiency.
Our production frontier estimation uses four inputs, cropland, labor, intermediates and total water. Specification tests validate the use of the two error structure of Battese and Coelli (1995) over ordinary least squares (OLS) and provide strong evidence for the chosen inefficiency effects structure compared to various alternatives.
The adjusted R 2 from OLS indicates that over 92% of the variance in the value of agricultural output is explained by the basic translog model, while the inefficiency effects are found to explain nearly 91% of the total variance in the stochastic frontier model.
The mean marginal effect of cropland is found to be negative, which indicates that it is used too much relative to the choices of an efficient producer. are compared to a small sample of prices, revealing that at least in that state water is providing far more value as an agricultural input than it costs to acquire and deliver.
Measured positive correlation between having a negative marginal product of intermediates and having a positive marginal product of irrigation suggests that a shift in inputs from intermediates to irrigation provided a natural avenue for substantial gains in efficiency in many states.
The inefficiency effects regression allows for the determination of the effects of state and farm level qualities on efficiency and output. Government subsidies are estimated to have a small positive effect on producer efficiency, with an average increase in value of output of 0.083 per real dollar of subsidies. Having either the riparian or prior appropriations water rights regimes boosts output relative to a hybrid system of the two, although only the riparian effect is statistically significant. Farm size effects have relatively large output elasticities, ranging from basically zero to 0.0286, with the highest values being for farms less than 50 acres and farms between 50 and 500 acres. The model suggests that a shift from larger acreage farms to lower acreage ones will generally be efficiency increasing.
The individual crop coefficients are each relatively small in magnitude, causing at most a 0.1% change in output for a 1% change in acreage for an average state. The ranking of these values does not closely correspond to existing rankings of crops by water intensity, with relatively water intensive wheat and soybeans being some of the most efficiency increasing crops and water intensive barley, sorghum, rice and corn all being efficiency reducing. On the whole, the crop specific results are more suitably viewed as a measure of the match of crops to their growing conditions rather than a direct measure of water efficiency of growing the crop.
The primary aim of this paper is to provide a tractable aggregate level view of the factors and characteristics of agricultural production and their effects on efficiency and output. This paper adapts the SFA methods for use in estimating the frontier for each state as a means of approximating an aggregate production function rather than estimating a farm or firm level production function explicitly. There is precedent for using SFA for aggregate production analysis in such a way. Coelli et al. (2003) examines agriculture in Bangladesh over the period of 1961-1992, using regions as decision making units, while Koop et al. (1999) uses SFA methods to investigate factors behind GDP growth in OECD countries. In each case the use of such methods provided useful insight into the mechanisms of production for their respective targets.
Section two outlines the models and methods used in this paper. Section three summarizes the data and discusses the empirical model estimation. Section four will conclude.
Stochastic Frontier Analysis
Stochastic frontier analysis, independently developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) , is a procedure for estimating a production frontier with two types of errors, a random error and a non-negative technical inefficiency effect. Although this method requires parametric assumptions, it is desirable because it allows for the use of standard hypothesis testing procedures and because it does not restrict producer observations to lie within the frontier estimated. The latter property is particularly desirable because it allows for the presence of measurement errors or other forms of statistical noise in the model, while with nonparametric approaches all deviations from the frontier are assumed to be due to inefficiency.
This paper adopts the particular stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1995) , which jointly estimates the structure of the technical inefficiency effects using a set of observable characteristics. This model has the following form for panel data,
The random errors, ν it , are assumed to be independent and identically distributed standard normals with variance σ v , while the inefficiency effects, u it , are assumed to be independently distributed as positive truncations of a normal distribution with mean z it α and standard deviation σ u .
In order to assess the effects of observable characteristics on technical inefficiency, it might seem natural to compute a stochastic frontier under the assumption of independent and identically distributed uits across producers and then run a second stage regression of the observable characteristics on the resulting inefficiency values. An iid assumption of this type is often made in the literature, with half-normal, truncated normal and gamma distributions all being used as distributions for the inefficiency effects 2 and such a two-stage procedure is widely used in such analyses. However, this procedure directly violates the assumption the that the inefficiency effects are identically distributed unless all of the second stage coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero (Coelli et al., 2005) .
To avoid this contradiction, the procedure this paper uses simultaneously esti-2 Details on the structure and properties of each of these models can be found in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) .
mates the production function and the mean of the inefficiency effects, z it α. In order to better understand the structure of this estimation it is helpful view the technical efficiency effects as follows,
where ω it is a positive truncation of a standard normal with standard deviation σ u such that ω it > −z it α. Note that this is mathematically equivalent to the distributional assumption for u it made in equation (1) and that by assumption the ω it s must be independently distributed but is not necessarily identically distributed nor positive.
To more easily obtain the estimates for the model it is convenient to parameterize it in terms of the total variance (σ 2 = σ 2 ν + σ 2 u ) and the share of the total variance due to the idiosyncratic inefficiency effects (γ = σ 2 u /σ 2 ). As long as the inefficiency effects are stochastic 3 then β, α, σ and γ can be estimated simultaneously using the method of maximum likelihood.
3 Data and Empirical Model
The empirical exercise of this paper uses a balanced panel of aggregated farm data at the state level. Looking at agriculture at the state level allows for a macro level of analysis that does not require detailed farm level data that is often hard to find for even a single state, let alone the entire continental U.S. Due of the nature of this setup, we use the terms producer and state(-year) interchangeably. We must take caution when it comes to policy recommendations from an estimation with aggregate variables, an issue which will be discussed further in Section 4.
Data on the value of agricultural output, inputs and a variety of producer characteristics comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's National Agricultural 3 That is γ = 0. If γ = 0 then the correct specification is an ordinary least squares regression. 4 The full likelihood function and first order conditions are presented in Battese and Coelli (1993 
where τ is a universal unit conversion factor, RAIN is yearly rainfall in inches, C is acres of cropland utilized, ET R is total raw evapotranspiration, AREA is total acreage, δ is the rate of conveyance losses in irrigation and IR is the amount of water withdrawals for irrigation. Thus by construction we have that ET 0 represents effective evapotranspiration. Counting only water withdrawn from existing sources for irrigation ignores that rainfall and irrigation are at least partial substitutes in agricultural production. The primary concept captured in this formulation is that if you expand cropland it will have a bigger immediate effect on total water use in agriculture in a rainy state versus a dry state, holding irrigation withdrawals constant.
For notational simplicity we refer to the sets of inputs, regions and additional inefficiency variables as X , R, and V, respectively. Our stochastic frontier model to be estimated is thus is defined as
where D ri is a dummy variable for state i being in region r, and ν it and ω it are distributed as in (1) and (2), respectively.
Regions were chosen by matching each state with its predominant Level I ecoregion (Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 1997), by majority if possible and by plurality if necessary. 5 California is taken as our base region, since it was the only state that constituted its own region under this criterion. This is intended to capture similarity of growing conditions and effects that could not be accounted for with data in a more meaningful way than choosing a more artificial division merely related to geographical proximity.
The set of additional characteristics, V, includes the log of the real value of federal farm subsidies, dummies for water rights regimes, acreage for sixteen different crop categories, the number of family run farms, the amount of surface withdrawals for irrigation, acres flood irrigated and a farm size distribution, separated into five categories by acreage. A number of these factors are included to account for effects due to issues that affect irrigation type, availability and intensity. Crop choices will be analyzed through the lens of water intensity per acre, while surface withdrawals and acres flood irrigated provide rough measures of irrigation efficiency, as will be discussed further in the Results section.
Of particular interest are the dummies regarding the three primary water rights regimes in the United States, riparian, prior appropriations and hybrid, which simply merges elements of the other two. Riparian systems attach water rights to any property that abuts a body of water and are generally proportional to frontage on the Maximum likelihood estimates for (4) and (5) are obtained using the frontier package for the R statistical computing environment (Coelli and Henningsen, 2011) .
This package uses the Fortran code of FRONTIER 4.1 6 as a base, and computes the maximum likelihood estimates using the ordinary least squares estimates (OLS) as an initial guess. Model specification tests and final results presented are all output from routines contained in this package.
The results of specification tests using likelihood ratio (LR) statistics are presented in Mixed χ 2 critical value from Kodde and Palm (1986) .
of no inefficiency effects, when the generalized likelihood ratio asymptotically has a mixed chi-square distribution (Kodde and Palm, 1986) . In (1) and (2) we test two restrictions of the structure of the technical inefficiency effects, that the share of variance explained by the inefficiency effects, γ, is equal to zero and that all of the coefficients of the second stage regression are equal to zero. The first null implies that our model is not an improvement over OLS, while the second implies that the technical inefficiency effects have a half-normal distribution (Aigner et al., 1977) . In each case the null hypothesis is rejected, with strong evidence in favor of the chosen specification of the technical inefficiency effects.
Finally, we test three restrictions of the inefficiency effects. The joint significance
of the crop effects is tested in (3) and this null is rejected, indicating that the set of crop variables provide valuable information as a whole, even though most are not individually significant. The sixteen crops included cover 18% of total cropland reported for the nation and many of them show up in various agricultural studies (e.g. Pimentel et al. (1997) and Postel (1998) ) as water intensive crops. The farm size effects are tested in (4) and this null is also rejected, indicating that the farm size distribution is jointly signficiant. Finally, we test the joint significance of the water related variables, including both irrigation measures and water rights dummies, in (5) and this null is rejected as well, justifying the inclusion of this array of direct and indirect measures of irrigation productivity in the inefficiency effects. On the whole these results providing evidence that the chosen specification for the inefficiency effects is preferred over one with these variables omitted. With a translog production function the values of the input coefficients themselves Significance levels: * = 10%, * * = 5%, * * * = 1%
Results
do not have an easily interpretable meaning, so to truly assess input effects we look at the marginal effect for each input. With a standard translog production function the marginal effect for input x, which is equivalent to that input's partial output elasticity, is calculated as
In our model this formula still holds for labor, intermediates and total available water.
However, due to the dependence of total water available on cropland and irrigation withdrawals, the marginal effects of these two variables on output are slightly more complicated. Calculating directly from the production function yields the following formulas,
∂ log(y)
again with ET 0 representing effective evapotranspiration and δ being the irrigation loss rate. For C an additional marginal effect comes from more land being subject to rain which increases effective evapotranspiration, while for IR the marginal effect is mitigated by irrigation withdrawals only accounting for a fraction of total water available and being subject to losses due to transportation and evaporation.
The raw marginal effects vary widely across state-year observations, with there being few cases of sign changes for a state from one year to another, so to better assess agricultural production behavior, we focus our attention on the mean values. Table   4 provides the mean marginal effects along with bootstrapped confidence intervals for each. 8 We know from standard producer theory that in a perfectly competitive market an optimizing producer will use a factor until its marginal product is equal 8 Computed using the percentile method, appropriate percentiles of the empirical distribution. For each marginal effect we are unable to reject the null that the data is distributed normally using the nonparametric Anderson-Darling test (Anderson and Darling, 1952) , justifying the use of this method over a more complicated procedure. with the marginal value added of this crucial input on average exceeding the price paid for it. However, it is important to note that these values used for comparison are not market prices, per se, but prices determined by regional irrigation districts to cover costs, often after being bought from the Bureau of Reclamation at relatively low rates.
Altogether the same 24 states have a positive marginal product of water in each year, 11 and altogether they comprise nearly 60% of total agricultural value produced over the sample period. This means that, at least for present uses, the other 26 states should reduce their relative usage of water. This could be accomplished by 9 The full list of states that have a negative marginal product in at least one year is Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin.
10 Examples from 1992 yields prices between $4.64 and $224.67. 11 These states include Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
improving water efficiency (e.g. growing less water intensive crops or using new irrigation methods) or altering the mix of inputs to increase production while keeping water use constant. ltogether they comprise nearly 60% of total agricultural value produced over the sample period. This means that, at least for present uses, the other 26 states should reduce their relative usage of water. This could be accomplished by improving water efficiency (e.g. growing less water intensive crops or using new irrigation methods) or altering the mix of inputs to increase production while keeping water use constant.
Another interesting interaction these results displays is that there is a high level of correlation (ρ = 0.577) between having a positive marginal product of water and having a negative marginal product of intermediates, suggesting that at some level 
12
This choice of model provides an additional margin to examine inefficiency, the inefficiency effects regression. It should be noted that a positive sign indicates that the variable increases inefficiency and a negative sign indicates that it lowers inefficiency, with the reverse being true if we consider the effect on final output. Because our dependent variable is logged, the coefficient magnitudes conveniently measure the total percentage change in input given a single unit change in that variable, holding all else equal. For an inefficiency effect not taken in logs the average percentage change in output for a one unit increase will be e −βz − 1, while if the variable is logged the percentage change for a 1% increase this average will be equal to −β z . For a state with the mean characteristics, the inefficiency effects lead to a 8% increase in the betvalue of output compared to the case with no inefficiency effects present. The full inefficiency regression results are given in Table 5 .
The coefficient on agricultural subsidies is negative and significant, resulting in a small marginal product of 0.083. So while subsidies have a mild positive effect on efficiency, for every dollar of subsidies, this estimation finds that less than ten cents of output is created. The two water rights regime coefficients are negative, indicating that having a fixed water rights regime reduces inefficiency versus the hybrid system.
However, only the riparian rights coefficient is statistically significant, with an output elasticity of 39.69%. It is difficult to attribute too much meaning to the water rights coefficients, as there is significant geographic correspondence between ecoregions and water rights regimes. An analysis with more disaggregated data may be able to separate these effects more clearly.
Five of the sixteen crop coefficients are significant, those for wheat, barley, sorghum, peanuts and potatoes. The coefficients for wheat and potatoes each decrease inefficiency, while the others increase it. Examining output elasticit
This highlights that these coefficients should be considered as a measure of the suitability of current chop choices, in essence how well each crop is currently matched with the growing conditions. 13 Viewed this way, the coefficients suggest that the most optimally grown crops are wheat, sugarcane and soybeans, while rice, corn, barley and sorghum are grown in the least ideal places. With his interpretation of the crop coefficients it is important to note that decreasing crops whose coefficients are negative and increasing those coefficients are positive cannot be taken as a quick fix to make a state a more efficient agricultural producer. Suitability of climate, soil Significance levels: * = 10%, * * = 5%, * * * = 1%
and other growing factors is crucial.
Both the family farm and farm size coefficients measure the effect of farm scale on inefficiency. The family farm effect is significant and positive, with an output elasticity of −0.069. In terms of farm size effects, four of the five coefficients are statistically significant and all of the coefficients are positive, indicating that increasing the number of farms in a state should always cause at least a modest increase efficiency. Shifting the distribution towards farms below 50 acres (S1) and farms between 50 and 500 acres (S2) relatively increases efficiency, with output elasticities of 0.0286 and 0.022 respectively. The final inefficiency effects examined are the two direct measures of irrigation, the amount of surface withdrawals and the acreage of flood irrigation.
Howell (2003) generally evaluates water use efficiency by type of irrigation system, and finds that surface methods are on average 65% efficient, versus 70-80% efficiency for sprinkler methods. However, our analysis finds a statistically insignificant result of a slightly positive output elasticity for flood irrigation. The surface irrigation coefficient is negative, as expected, and statistically significant, with an output elasticity of −0.0018. The values for these two output elasticities are nearly equal and opposite to each other, meaning that a 1% increase in surface withdrawals for flood irrigation should have nearly no effect on the value of output. One major drawback to the analysis of irrigation is that the USGS did not split irrigation data into more than two categories until 1995, leaving us unable to account for the rise of microirrigation methods, which Howell (2003) finds are on average 85-90% efficient and thus would be expected to play a larger role in the future of irrigation.
Conclusion
This paper presented a state-level estimation of agricultural production to analyze water use behavior in that sector in the United States. Using the two-error stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1995) with data from a variety of U.S. gov-ernment agencies, we simultaneously estimated a translog production function and technical inefficiency effects, which allow us to measure raw technical inefficiency using a variety of farm variables and characteristics.
Our four input translog estimates yield on average a negative output elasticity for cropland, indicating that it is used more than an efficient producer would choose to. that at least in that state water is providing at least ten times as much value as an agricultural input than it costs to acquire and deliver. Overall the primary regression results suggest that major shifts are possible to improve water efficiency or alter the mix of inputs to increase production while keeping water use constant. In particular, measured positive correlation between having a negative marginal product of intermediates and a positive marginal product of irrigation suggests that a shift in inputs from intermediates to irrigation seems a promising avenue to provide substantial gains in efficiency in many states.
The inefficiency effects regression finds that government subsidies have a small positive effect on producer efficiency, which translates into a small marginal product per dollar of 0.083. Having the non-transferable riparian water rights regime provides a statistically significant 39.7% boost to output relative to being under a hybrid regime. Farm size effects have output elasticities ranging from basically zero to 0.0286, with the highest values being for farms less than 50 acres and farms between 50 and 500 acres. The model suggests that a shift towards smaller farms at the expense of larger ones should lead to sizeable efficiency gains. Irrigation type effects are found to be small, although the data available provided incomplete information about irrigation choices for most of the sample.rable riparian water rights regime provides a statistically significant 39.7% boost to output relative to being under a hybrid regime.
Farm size effects have output elasticities ranging from basically zero to 0.0286, with the highest values being for farms less than 50 acres and farms between 50 and 500 acres. The model suggests that a shift towards smaller farms at the expense of larger ones should lead to sizeable efficiency gains. Irrigation type effects are found to be small, although the data available provided incomplete information about irrigation choices for most of the sample.
As would be expected individual crop coefficients are each relatively small in magnitude, implying at most a 0.1% change in output for a 1% change in a crop in an average state. The ranking of these values does not closely correspond to existing rankings of crops by water intensity, with relatively water intensive wheat and soybeans being some of the most efficiency increasing crops and water intensive barley, sorghum, rice and corn all being efficiency reducing. On the whole, the crop specific results should be viewed as a measure of the suitability of crop choices and not necessarily a direct measure of water efficiency of growing the crop.
This analysis implies that differences in water use have major implications for farm policy as a whole and provide interesting directions for future investigations.
Additionally, better data, for example about irrigation choices, soil quality and other possible legal restrictions that may exist beyond the standard rights frameworks could provide valuable information to a stochastic frontier estimation such as this one. Observed relationships in the model, between water and intermediate inputs in particular, suggest concrete areas that policies could target to spur efficiency gains. Use of a wide panel of individual farm data would be ideal for providing more specific policy guidance and improving both the efficiency of water use and agricultural production
